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     CYBER SELF-DEFENCE: «WE ARE NOT IN  A CYBER WAR YET,
WE ARE IN  CYBER COLD WAR» [1]
The digital environment became an indispensable part of human
activities performed in XXI century. Technological development has a
great impact on the functioning of the economy, infrastructure and
constitutes an important element of overall sustainable development.
Cyber space is widely used in different aspect of human life.
Computer networks facilitate different aspects of international relations.
Financial, educational, and health institutions, as well as telecommunication,
navigation and logistics are dependent on the computer networks. Despite
that cyber space has been widely applied in international warfare.
Already in 2010 the Economist recognised cyber space as the
5th domain of international warfare [2].
Before lex specialis that governs the use of cyber space in
international warfare is adopted the states and international community
refer to the core rules of public international law, international law of
military operations and armed conflicts and the guiding principles of
«soft» law - resolutions, codes of conduct, etc.
This article is devoted to the public side of cyber attacks in
international warfare and covers the following matters:
1. What actions in the digital domain constitute a use of force in
the sense of Article 2(4) UN Charter and what are the criteria for
determining whether that acts may be qualified as armed force?
2. What acts of force constitute an armed attack giving rise to
the exercise of the right of self-defence and  what are the criteria for
determining whether an act of «cyber armed force» crossed the
threshold of armed attack?
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3. What criteria of necessity and proportionality will be applied to
regulate the response against the attack if an act constituting a cyber-
armed attack has taken place?
4. If an act of cyber armed force is carried out, how can it be
attributed to a particular State or non-State entity in terms of the law
relating to international responsibility?
In determining the lawful use of force Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter states: «All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations».
Attacks against critical infrastructure may cause an effect worse
that economic crisis. The consequences of actions taken in cyber space
may lead to horrific consequences and cause irreparable harm to the state.
Attacks against national information infrastructure may end up with mass
disturbances in society, economic loss and undermine political systems.
Thus, one of the main questions regarding cyber use of force is whether to
what extent actions performed in cyber space that resulted in the harm to
state property or civil population can constitute the use of force?
It is important to make a remark the main actors in international
warfare remain the states. However the role of the non-state actors is
undeniable. Both states and non-state actors become involved in cyber
warfare. Ralf Langner provides the definition on what can be considered
as cyber war. Cyber warfare is maliscious manipulation of cyber systems
(smartphones, computers, home entertainment, control/automation systems)
supporting or substitution the conventional act of war where the impact that you
are achieving or trying to achieve is equivalent to conventional attack [3].
    The prohibition to use force is reflected in both legal instruments
addressed to states – the UN Charter and in customary international law [4].
Moreover, the principle of non-use of force is established in the Declaration
of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations. The Declaration provides that all states should refrain from the
use of force in their international relations, and indicates that wars of
aggression are a crime against peace for which international responsibility
is engaged. Furthermore, the International Law Commission in the
commentaries to the Vienna Convention Law of Treaties identified the
prohibition of the use of force as a jus cogens norm. Judges of the
International Court of Justice in their decision, and Separate Opinions to
Nicaragua case, largely supported that recognition [5]. Nevertheless, the
prohibition of the use of force does not mean that war, as such, is absolutely
prohibited. The UN Charter does not restrict the states to go to war. It establishes
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the conditions under which the war may be permitted. There are two
exceptions, which allow the UN Member States to refer to the use of
force lawfully; Firstly, the Security Council may authorise an enforcement
operation for maintenance of international peace and security on the basis
of Chapter VII. Secondly, the states may use force in response to armed
attack when exercising their right to self-defence under Article 51 [6].
It is recognized that state have the sovereign right to control cyber
infrastructure and cyber activities within its territory [7]. The group of
experts collaborating over the Manual emphasized two consequences
of the State’s sovereignty over cyber infrastructure within its territory.
The state exercises legal and regulatory control over cyber infrastructure.
Moreover, the state must protect its cyber infrastructure regardless whether
it belongs to the government or to private sector. In addition the state will
exercise the jurisdiction over its nationals and other the persons involved in
cyber operation on that state’s territory.
Thus, only states may consent to and facilitate cyber operations
conducted from its territory. Subsequently the state will bear international
responsibility for a cyber operation attributable to it.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the state to use force against
another state’s territory. International Court of Justice has stated that Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter, regarding the prohibition of the use of
force applies to «any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed» [8].
Hence, engagement of state’s cyber capabilities in military operation that
was conducted by the state’s armed forces and resulted in damage scaled
to the one caused by kinetic warfare will trigger the use of force in the
sense of Article 2(4).
In order to define the actions performed in cyber space that can be
considered as the use of force it is necessary to outline to the main
instruments for such determination.
First, and the most important element with regards to determination
of cyber attack as a use of force is the so-called result test. The result test,
as it is implied from the name which refers to the consequences of the
attack occurred [9].
The notion of the result test is greatly supported by Schmitt, who
claims that cyber attack «spans the spectrum of the consequentiality»
[10] and Y.Dinstein also agrees that determination of the use of force depends
on violent consequences [11]. Taking into account the result test there
must be considered two situations:
- the use of cyber attack as a part of military campaign. Computer
may be used as a weapon and operate the techniques of physical attacks.
During the Russia-Georgia war Russia has integrated the cyber attack as
a separate element to the physical attacks against Georgia [12]. Destabilizing
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the government networking systems and underpinning the reputation of the
current government helped Russia to complete the attack successfully.
- the use of cyber attack for non-military means, which was reflected
in physical use of force. A good example of non-military means may be an
attack resulted in economic/financial losses. If attacks caused the economic
losses would be equated to the use of force, that would unreasonably extend
the meaning of Article 2(4). The attacks, that implicate a negative impact
on financial infrastructure of the state, may not be qualified as the use of
force, but rather as a cyber crime. Consequently they will be regulated by
the rules of international criminal law.  In order to reach the level of the use
of force cyber attack must cause the consequences, graver then economic loss.
Thus, in the light of the result test, not all cyber attacks constitute
violation of Act 2(4). Only those actions, which resulted in property loss
and factual injury, and damages/injuries were of the same nature as the
ones caused by the traditional weapons.
Another determinative condition, which can bring the cyber attack
to the level of use of force in the meaning of Article 2(4) is the methods of
cyber attack. In other words, while defining whether the attack was equal
to armed force, attention must be drawn to the question of whether cyber
was used as a weapon of warfare. Here it is important to distinguish those
computer programs, which may be used as a tool of warfare and those,
which are designed with a specific military objective. A computer itself is
not a weapon, but if employed offensively by the military unit in order to
achieve military goals, it will be constitute a part of military asset. Hence,
computer data is not a weapon itself, but in certain applications may cause
damage to be equated to the use of force. Stuxnet was developed solely to
disrupt industrial control system of a power plant. Programs operating military
aircrafts or missile launches are originally created for facilitation of its
operational means. Thus computer programs and viruses, designed
specifically for the military use will to be considered as weapons of warfare,
and that would be taken into account during the determination of certain
acts as the use of force. In order to assimilate a cyber attack to the use of
force, it must be regarded through the lens of an armed attack. The damages
and injuries resulted from cyber attack must be of the the same scale or
even higher than damages from an armed attack. In this case the cyber
attack will be recognised as a use of force and consequently constitute a
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Another important element is military intent [13]. A cyber attack will
constitute an armed attack if intended to cause direct physical damage to
tangible objects or injury to human beings. Generally speaking cyber attack
launched against another state myust be backed by unconditional military
intention to target a specific object or to reach sertain military objective.
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It is important to point out that the use of cyber attack against another
state, even if the latter has not reach the scale of the use of force in the meaning
of Article 2(4), for instance cyber espionage, may violate non-intervention principle,
stated in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. However it is not always clear whether
espionage will be considered as intervention. Interference in cyber space of
another state may reach the scale of intervention only if coercive element is at
place. Determination of the coercive element requires a lot of data to be
looked at, and will be defined upon each particular case.
The Security Council is the central organ of the UN and governs the
use of force in cases of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or in the
event an act of aggression. In order to maintain peace and security, the
Security Council has the discretionary powers to deploy armed forces,
establish and authorize enforcement actions on the territory of the state
and impose sanctions. By doing so, the Security Council acts in the light of
objectives and principles of the UN Charter. Under no circumstances, may
the aforementioned actions be qualified as those intended to defeat
aggressive acts emanating from the belligerent parties. The Security Council
is entrusted with the implementation of the collective security against the
threat to international peace. All 197 of the UN Member States delegate
their powers to the Security Council for maintenance of international peace
and security [14] thus accepting its decisions as binding [15].
Likewise, the Security Council is the only body, which «determines the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of
aggression» and «decides what measures shall be taken...to maintain
international peace and security» [16]. The Security Council in its decision
often refers to «threat to the peace» because this term is broader and provides
more conditions to act [17]. For instance, the Security Council recognized that
«proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as
their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and
security» [18]. Evidently, grave violations of human rights [19] and international
terrorism [20] have been recognized as conditions, which presuppose threat
to the peace. Hence, threat to the peace does not always encompass either
military actions or operations where armed force was involved.
With regards to cyber attacks, Rule 18 of Tallin Manual prescribes the
ability to refer to forceful measures, which may include the use of cyber force.
Hence, if all peaceful means to restore a conflict have been exhausted, the Security
Council may impose cyber measures against the violation. Despite the fact that
Article 42 of the UN Charter outlines enforcement measure taken by air, sea or
land of the states, it is accepted that this scope may be extended to cyber space
[21].  Commentaries to the Rule 18 add that Security Council now may not only
employ cyber operation resolution against the violating state, but authorize kinetic
operation against the cyber attack emanating from that state’s territory.
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The Security Council would not take responsive actions against state-
sponsored cyber attack producing little or no damage. However a computer
network intrusion that caused large-scaled damage, economic loss, and
death of civilians would well be ascertained as a reasonable factor to invoke
the right to self-defence.
The fact the cyber attacks are performed without use of traditional kinetic
weapons does not preclude the idea that later attack can be qualified as «armed»
in the meaning of Article 51. Thus, it is important to determine under which
conditions a cyber attack may be considered as an armed attack, giving rise to
the exercise of the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
An armed attack is an attack where significant armed force is used
and which exceeds the level of a mere armed incident. Small-scaled attacks
may constitute the use of force in the meaning of Article 2(4) but cannot be
justified with self-defence. Justification is only possible if an armed attack
has been committed or there is clear evidence of an impending attack [22].
Commentaries to the UN Charter stated that the purpose of Article
2(4) is to ban military force [23]. It is envisaged that in certain extreme
situations, where the consequences of the use of non-military force may be
equivalent to an armed attack, giving rise to referring to the right to self-
defence, the scope of Article 51 may be extended. Prof. Y.Dienstein also
emphasizes the existence of the situation where a violating state uses force
against another state or non-state entity without an armed attack [24]. In
practice states often invoke Article 51 in order to justify their use of force
even when armed attack against them per se has not occurred. Armed
attack occurred against the UN Member state by another state or non-
state entity, infers the violation of Article 2(4). But not every breach of
Article 2(4) constitutes an armed attack. The states may invoke self-defence
in response to actions, which caused significant and harmful consequences
with a relatively large scale of damage.
The majority of legal writers accept the possibility of self-defence in
response to cyber attack, although opinions vary. Prof. Y.Dienstein noted
that from the legal point of view electronic or kinetic means of the attack
do not really matter if it leads to distructive results [25]. Silver considers
that in case where the actions taken in cyber space have caused a disruptive
effect, it will be more appropriate to apply Article 2(4) rather than Article
51 [26]. Waxman also supports this concept. He foresees proportionate
countermeasures to be a reasonable response to cyber attack and argues
that recourse to force is unacceptable [27]. The latter argument is also
agreed by the authors of the Tallin Manual. Rule 9 allow the injured state to
respond with proprtionate countermeasures, including cyber
countermeasures [28]. The majority of legal writers agree that since cyber
attacks results in irreparable damages, it will be ruled through the lens of
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the following three elements – intent, method and consequences. The US
Department of Defence in their Assessment emphasized that while taking
a decision regarding invocation of Article 51, the focus will be made on the
offender’s intent and the consequences of the offending actions rather
than on the mechanism by which the damage was done [29].
So what kind of actions will likely turn cyber attack to an armed attack?
Firstly it is important to define whether the damage resulted from a
cyber attack could previously have been achieved only by a kinetic attack.
Graham provides an example with power grid breakdown [30]. Today’s
power grids are controlled by computer systems, thus actions in cyber
domain would be the easiest way to disrupt it [31]. Furthermore regarding
the power grid disruption NATO recently emphasized, that «... the risk of
a large-scale attack on NATO’s command and control systems or energy
grids could readily warrant consultations under Article 4 and could
possibly lead to collective defence measures under Article 5...» [32].
Secondly in order to launch a military response to cyber attack, it must
be determined to what extent that attack can be equated as a hostile act and
whether it was launched for military purposes [33]. The cyber attack will
trigger the right to self-defence if the object and purpose of the attack are
equal to military acts. For example, launching Stuxnet virus is an offensive
act and aimed to disrupt the power plant control system. A power plant is a
tangible object and its breakdown will lead to a disadvantageous outcome.
Penetration to its computer system with a purpose to change proper flow of
the processes, consequent destabilization of enemy’s military forces and as a
result electricity is shut down across the civilian population, proves that the
level of armed attack is achieved.  Hence, the intrusion to the power plant
computer system may be considered as an action having a hostile intent.
Thridly the consequences of the attack must reach the same scale of
damage as the one from the traditional attack. Robertson supports the idea
claiming that «until a consensus develops for the need for a new normative
architecture, it would appear that the most rational and practical test of
whether a computer attack can be the precipitating event for the exercise
of lawful self-defence, is whether the consequences are major damage to
or destruction of vital military or civilian infrastructure or the loss of
human life» [34]. For example, a cyber manipulation computer network system,
which controls dam functions caused significant disruptive flooding and put the
local population in extreme and harsh living conditions. Despite the fact that no
kinetic attack was engaged the latter would be considered an armed attack
because the overall damage reaches the scale of armed attack or even worse.
Self-defence will only be lawful if it constitutes necessary and
proportionate response [35] aimed to repeal prior attack and taken within
reasonable period of time after the later has been performed.
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Degree of necessity and proportionality is to be determined by the
injured state. The Responding state will decide what [forceful or alternative
non-forceful] actions will be necessary to repel or overturn a cyber attack.
The problem with regards to cyber attack is that it is not always
easy to identify the effects and consequently measure the scope of
proportional response against it. Firstly, they may become visible only after
certain period of time. The latter may hamper a principle of immediacy.
With respect to a cyber attack, application of principle of immediacy will be
considered as lawful when the state became aware and got evidences that
the attack has been performed. Secondly, methods of cyber attacks evolve
dynamically. The Respondent state is not always fully aware about the
author of the attack and the techniques used in the performance of the
cyber offence. Moreover, it is possible that attack will produce greater
harm than it was planned in the beginning. Disruption of power grid providing
electricity to military bases may result in blackouts in the electronics used
in military hospital.  Where a cyber attack targets a database or denies
service for important assets of the computer network or electronic
infrastructure, it is up to the victim state to determine to what extent the
latter can be considered as an imminent armed attack [36] and subsequently
determine a proportionate response.
Lastly, it is relevant to refer to Robertson’s «3 prong test» [37].
Firstly, response to cyber attack may be justified if subsequent attacks
were part of a military campaign of the state. Secondly, cyber attack in
response constitutes an irreversible step towards unavoidable armed attack.
And thirdly, the defender state relies on the armed response as the last
opportunity to defeat forthcoming attack. In order to repel an attack the
victim state may launch a computer attack in response, intended to disable
the equipment being used by the violator. The issue of proportionality will
likely be minimized if a responsive cyber attack has been launched as a
measure of self-defense against another cyber attack.
The question to be answered here is whether it is possible to invoke
of the right to self-defence to imminent cyber attack? Indeed, with regards
to current cyber capabilities timing frame may be easily hindered and a
cyber attack may be identified much later than the factual attack has been
launched.
Another fact that creates a problem to identification of a cyber attack
is that attackers may operate from the computer, connected to the server
of neutral state. This may enable them to hinder the track of original offender
making determination of the source of the attack almost impossible [38].
On the other hand, the Responsive state may be in need to use computer
networks owned by or passing through neutral countries and that may be
considered as a violation of their sovereignty.
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Furthermore, cyber attack may be a precursor to further kinetic
armed attack. That means that states may exercise their right to self-
defence not only against cyber attack but in order to defeat further
kinetic or another graver cyber attack. The problem is that it is not
always clear when a cyber attack will be an «armed attack», thus not
conceivable what kind of responsive actions would be proportionate to
such an attack, especially where the attack inflicts little or no physical
damage or loss of life [39].
With respect to aforementioned the issue of anticipatory self-defence
against cyber attack seems to be problematic. One of the most likely
scenarios of anticipatory self-defence against cyber attack is the situation
where a cyber attack constitutes a predecessor element of the upcoming
physical attack [40].
Prof. Y.Dinstein states that Article 51 does not emphasize the type
of weapons to be used in self-defence [41] thus the armed attack can be
repelled with another cyber attack. Deployment of cyber weapons [as
Stuxnet and Night Dragon], aimed to disrupt strategically important military
targets and cause damage equal to the one caused by the use of force, is
not internationally prohibited [42]. The status of cyber attacks has not been
determined as illegal actions in international law or a forbidden method of
warfare. However, such a response will be considered as lawful if the
criteria of lawful self-defence are met [43].
The criteria of jus ad bellum which govern the fairness of war and
determine whether engaging in war was lawful and properly justified, remain
unchanged for years. However increasing engagement of non-state actors
in present armed conflicts has brought a number of dynamic changes to
the understanding of the notion of just war. International organizations and
non-state entities have become an undeniable part of the international arena.
Although the question of whether the non-state actors can be recognized
as fully-fledged subjects to international law is still under consideration.
The use of force is a delicate question. At present we may reckon
that non-state actors are bound by the prohibition of the use of force [44].
Both the UN Charter and customary international law prohibit unilateral
use of force. One may argue that only states are the signing Parties to
the UN Charter, therefore it is reasonable to assume that Charter
provisions are only directed to states. However the prohibition of the
use of force is a jus cogens norm [45], i.e. one of the fundamental
principles of international law. Therefore it is reasonable to claim that
non-state actors and international organisations should adhere the
obligation not to recourse to force. Furthermore they must comply with
the principles of international humanitarian law. Hereby, I present a
few facts supporting this idea.
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The Security Council in its binding resolution imposed obligations
upon non-state actors and armed groups, mentioning that all parties to the
conflict must comply with the provisions of international humanitarian
law [46]. Indeed, the Court has already recognised international
humanitarian norms as erga omnes, meaning they are addressed to all the
participants in the international conflict [47]. Thus keeping in mind the fact
that the Security Council once provided the binding decision upon non-state
actors, it is likely that the obligation not to recourse to force under the UN
charter is also applicable to them.
Another example refers to 9/11 events in New York. After 9/11
more and more legal writers recognise that a state may invoke its right to
self-defence not only against states, as prescribed in Article 51, but also
against the non state actors in response to a prior attack against that state.
Considering the aforementioned, non-state actors are bound with an
obligation not to use force and must comply with jus ad bellum provisions.
Self-defence may be exercised on behalf of the state, meaning that
only a legitimate state authority is able to declare the use of force as a legal
response. The question is what my be considered as an «authority». One
of the elements of the «authority» is to represent people’s interests. Hence,
non-state entities may fall into this category [48]. For example, rebellious
movements exercising their right to seld-determination do represent the
interests of the particular group of people. In order to defend themselves,
they may launch an attack and that would be a reasonabe repsonse.
Presumably, when this group of people, without a governing authority, is
put in a threatening situation or becomes a victim of an act of aggression, a
«non-state organization ... can act as a legitimate authority and justly
engage in violence on behalf of the people» [49]. To conclude the
aforementioned, the rules of jus ad bellum may be applicable to the non-
state actors involved in the armed conflict, hence, must be adhered by them.
In other cases attacks that are not state-sponsored [or state-
goverend] will not be justified with self-defense. The invokation of the right
to self-defence will not be accpeted if malicious acts against another state
have been performed by private individuals or organized groups, unless the
state adopts the conduct or the conduct will be attributable to it according
the the ruls of international law of states responsibilities.
Hence if the non-state actors are bound with an obligation not to use
force, and only states may invoke the right to self-defence the main problem
with respect to non-state actors comes with attribution. The cyber attack conducted
from the territory of the state may not necessarily be attributable to that state.
The question of attribution remains one of the biggest problems in
cyber warfare. It is very complicated to determine who exactly committed
the attack and who exercised the control over the people involved in the
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commission of the attack. Therefore, the question of who will bear
responsibility for damage caused by cyber attacks remains unresolved.
The issue of attributability of a cyber attacks will be reviewed through the
lens of Article of State Reposnibility and, since recently, The Tallinn Manual
on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.
The state will be internationally responsible for the wrongful act if
that act was committed by the state organ [50] or under the direction or
control of the State [51]. Hence, if the cyber attack has been performed by
the state organ or private persona whose actions have been authorized by
the state, the conduct of the attack will be attributable to the state. However
The Tallin Manual offers an interesting approach regarding attribution of
cyber attack to the state. Rule 7 states that cyber operation that has been
launched from governmental cyber infrastructure will not sufficient evidence
for attribution of the operation to that State. The latter will be considered as
a mere indication that the operation was performed with involvement of
that particular State. However the commentaries to Tallin Manual indicate
that the Rule 7 will not be applied to the cyber operation originated from
cyber infrastructure that was not a part of governmental cyber infrastructure
even though located on the territory of that state. Moreover, Rule 8 adds
that cyber operation that has been routed via the cyber infrastructure located
in a State will also not be sufficient enough to attribute the operation to that State.
It is interesting to compare the aforesaid with ARSIWA’s Article 4
that attributes conduct of the state body to the state. Traditional approach
of the attribution of the state-generated wrongful attack to the state, prescribed
in Articles on States Responsibility is supported in the Tallin Manual. The authors
of the commentaries to Tallin Manual highlight that the conduct of the cyber
operation launched from the state cyber infrastructure «cannot be followed in
cyber space» [52]. The argument is defended with the possibility [fear?] of
undesirable intrusion of the non-state actors into states cyber and military
assets followed by their unlawful on behalf of the state.
Then, whereas the Rules 8 presumes that the state is not associated
with the cyber operation, the Rule 7 refers to unconditional relation between
the state and cyber attack emanating from its cyber infrastructure.
Commentaries to ARSIWA note that conduct will be attributable to the
state only if it «directed or controlled the specific operation» and was
an integral part of that operation. It is added on that the principle does not
extend to conduct which «was only incidentally or peripherally
associated with an operation» and which the State was not able to direct
or control [53]. Hence in the language of Rule 7 it would be reasonable
perhaps not to exclude a possibility to attribute the conduct of cyber operation
to the state but rather to refer to «direction and control test» mentioned in
the commentaries to ARSIWA. Nevertheless, the disclaimer put on NATO
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Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence website states that at
this moment the Tallinn Manual can not be considered as an official document
or legal source.
Another controversy will arise when the attack has been launched
by the non-state actor independently without any supervision by state. Even
if the state adopts the conduct of that non-state actor it is absolutely unclear
to what extend the rule stated in Article 11 of the Articles on State
Responsibility may be applied to cyber context. Whather it would be possible
to make that State responsible in the light of Rule 7 of the Tallinn Manual?
The Tallinn Manual although remain the most specific scope of rules
regarding cyber warfare bring new controversies to already existing
problems posed before the states, international organizations and non-state
actors towards attribution of the cyber attacks and international responsibility
for them.
Cyber capabilities offer the prospects of more successful and less
violent warfare. States already use cyber as a multiplier of the
accomplishment of kinetic operations. National policy makers of the
European states concentrate on defensive cyber capabilities. Countries
like the US and China actively invest in the creation and training of cyber
forces. They are also engaged in the development of cyber weapons. That
proves existence of such projects as Stuxnet, Flame and Red Dragon that
have been created explicitly as a tool of warfare and cannot be used for
other means. Hence if the computer attacks became one of the methods
of international military campaigns the question arises how to define, regulate,
attribute and respond to them. Today, the core international legal instruments
like the UN Charter, Articles on State Responsibilities, academic researches
and experts reports can be the only guides into cyber warfare regulation.
In order to sum up the content of this article I would like to outline the
following statements.
Firstly, not all offensive actions performed in cyber may reach the
level of the use of force. In order to equate cyber attack to the cyber use of
force, and subsequently be able to provide an armed response against such
an attack the following criteria must be fulfilled:
- An attack is launched with a military intent; the state launched an
attack with clear knowledge and intention of the consequences. By using
cyber attack military commander intended to achieve the military goals.
- An attack is used as a tool of warfare; Cyber may not only be used
as a tool for facilitation of aerial or naval forces. Cyber attack may be a
multiplier of the whole campaign, but may be also a separate campaign.
- The method of cyber attack is developed explicitly for military
purposes [or for a particular military operation] and can only be used within
the operation.
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- The consequences of the attack reach the level of physical attack; It
is necessary to draw the line between economic, social and military
consequences. Grave economic and social effects of cyber attack would not
be bring the attack to the level of the use of force. Only those attacks which
caused human injury, death, put national population into harsh living conditions
or damaged the objects that are strategically important for state function,
would be qualified as the use of force in the meaning of Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter, and hence enable the injured state to recourse to armed response.
It is accepted that states may respond the cyber attack with another
cyber attack or using other means to restore the conflict. Once the recourse
to force becomes necessary the states may restore the conflict with the
use of cyber force and vise versa, with forceful actions against the cyber
attack. It is up to the injured state to decide which actions would be necessary
and proportionate in order to defeat an attack. Moreover, Security Counsil
may authorise cyber measure against the breach of the peace, threat to the
peace of act of aggression or empower peace enforcement operation against
a cyber attack of large scale.
In case cyber attack has been occured, and was qualified as a violation
of the law of the use of force it remains unlcear how the matter of attribution will
be resolved. Due to the lack of special rules governing international responsibility
for the damages caused by cyber attacks, traditional rules on the law of state
responsibility will be applied. Thus, if there is be a proof that cyber attack has
been launched by the state organ, the wrong will be attributable to the state.  If
the state did not launch an attack itself but provided sponsor support, the attribution
would be determined through the notion of effective control, ie to what extent
the state exercised control over the cyber attack. The wording of the Tallinn
Manual add certain ambiguities to the issue of attribution in cyber context. However
having no legal power at the moment the Rules may only be considered as
personal opinion of a group of independent experts. Not only states may be the
actors in cyber war arena. Non-state actors also may be involved in cyber
conflict. In the situation where the group of individuals launches a cyber attack
that reaches the level of the use of force it must be determined to what extent
the state exercised effective control over the attackers, or whether it could have
known about the wrongs emanating from its territory.In the abscense of such
proof the attack will not be attributable to the state.
Lastly, in order to resolve the cyber conflict the general rules of
warfare, provisions of the existing public international and customary
international law will be interpreted according to the factual circumstances.
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